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Schmitt: The Law of Cyber Targeting

THE L AW OF C YBER TARGETING
Michael N. Schmitt

T

he 2008 war between Georgia and Russia was predictably short, as Russian
military might quickly trumped Georgian nationalist enthusiasm. Beyond its
momentous geopolitical implications, it was the first war in which cyber activities loomed large; the conflict marked the public birth of “cyber war,” or at least
cyber in war.1
Cyber operations were not a completely new phenomenon. Most notably, they
had played a significant geopolitical role in the previous year, when “hacktivists”
around the world directed malicious cyber operations at NATO member Estonia
following its transfer of a Soviet-era statue commemorating the Great Patriotic
War from central Tallinn to the outskirts of the capital.2 But this was not “war”
in the traditional sense of two or more states engaged in armed hostilities against
each other. In the Georgian case, by contrast, the cyber activities took place on
belligerent territory during an armed conflict that involved classic kinetic military operations. Although civilians launched most of the attacks, and while they
caused no physical damage or injury, there is no question that, unlike the events
in Estonia, international humanitarian law (IHL, also known as the law of war,
law of armed conflict, and jus in bello) applied.
Cyber activities have become an indelible facet of contemporary warfare, not
just for cyber-empowered militaries such as that of the United States, but also for
low-tech forces. Terrorist and insurgent groups benefit from the use of the Internet to recruit fighters and to finance operations. Social media are exploited for
purposes that range from passing targeting information to directing the deployment of forces (the insurgent “flash mob”). Mobile phones are as much part of
the twenty-first-century kit bag as weapons, and e-mail and texting have become
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pervasive means of military communication. The Arab Spring was a watershed
in this regard, and cyber operations are ongoing in the conflicts in Ukraine and
Syria. It is quite simply unimaginable that a contemporary conflict would not involve some manner of cyber operations, whether as simple as passing intelligence
information using smartphones or as complicated as bringing down the enemy’s
integrated air-defense system.
In light of the role that cyber operations are playing in contemporary conflicts,
attention must be paid to the law that governs these activities—to borrow a sports
analogy, a team that takes the field without knowing the rules is usually going to
lose, even if it is the better team. International law, and particularly IHL, exerts a
powerful influence on tactics, operational planning, and strategic decision making in modern warfare. The fight can be won on the battlefield but lost in the
court of public and international opinion when one side appears to have acted
outside the law. Given the novelty of cyber operations as a method of warfare
during an armed conflict, any alleged misuse, even at the tactical level, has the
potential for strategic consequences.
The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, based in Tallinn,
Estonia, has taken the global lead in addressing this issue. In 2009 it launched a
three-year project to examine the application of international law, especially that
governing the use of force, to cyber operations. Over twenty distinguished legal
scholars and government legal advisers came together to produce the Tallinn
Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, a resource currently being expanded in the Centre’s “Tallinn 2.0” project.3
Informed by the Tallinn Manual process, in which the author served as director, this article examines IHL’s core norms—those governing targeting—as
applied to cyber operations. It does so by following the legal logic applicable to
virtually every targeting operation, from naval gunfire and air attack to specialforces operations and space attacks.4 In each such case, those who plan, approve,
and execute targeting missions have to ask the following questions:
• What law applies to my operation?
• May I engage the intended target?
• Is the weapon I want to use legal?
• What precautions must I take to avoid collateral damage?
• Do the scope and degree of likely collateral damage prohibit me from
engaging the target?
There is now widespread agreement that international humanitarian law applies in its entirety to cyber operations conducted during an armed conflict.5
Thus, the questions set out above apply fully to targeting in the cyber context,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/3
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albeit with a degree of interpretive creativity at times. This article will explain how
each is resolved with respect to cyber operations. The explanation is designed for
policy makers and operators who conduct, rely on, approve, or are targeted by
cyber operations. In the contemporary strategic environment, knowledge of the
law applicable to cyber warfare is quite simply indispensable.
THE APPLICABLE LAW (PART I)
The threshold question in every targeting operation is whether the international
humanitarian law rules even apply. IHL comes into play only when there is a
war—an “armed conflict,” in technical legal parlance. There are two forms of
armed conflict, international and noninternational.6 The former exists when
hostilities break out between two or more countries, whereas the latter involves
hostilities at a fairly high level between an organized armed group and a state
or between two or more organized armed groups. For example, the use of force
against Ukraine by Russia clearly created an international armed conflict, whereas the hostilities between Bashar al-Assad’s forces and those opposing his regime
in Syria are noninternational in character. Unless one of these two forms of
armed conflict exists, IHL is inapplicable, in which case human rights norms and
domestic law serve as the core constraints on the targeting operation in question.
Whenever there is an armed conflict of either sort, IHL governs those cyber
operations having a nexus with the conflict.7 To take a simple example, it is no less
a violation of IHL, and no less a war crime, to conduct cyber operations intended
to kill members of the civilian population than it is to bomb or shell them; the
same law prohibiting direct attacks on civilians is breached.8 How that IHL rule
applies is discussed below, but it is incontestable that it applies in its entirety to
conflict-related cyber operations.
The somewhat more challenging legal question is whether cyber operations
alone may qualify as armed conflicts to which IHL applies. In other words, if
there is no armed conflict in the first place, can one begin as a result of cyber
operations? The question is essential, because once an armed conflict breaks out,
it becomes lawful to direct cyber and kinetic strikes against the armed forces and
military objectives. This is so irrespective of blame for starting the conflict. To
address this issue, it is necessary to distinguish between international and noninternational armed conflict.
If there are two or more states involved, the first criterion for an international
armed conflict is met. The second, that “hostilities” have taken place, is somewhat
ambiguous.9 Two questions present themselves in this regard—one qualitative,
the other quantitative. First, can cyber exchanges qualify as hostilities, or are they
of such a unique nature that it is inappropriate to deem them such? It would seem
logical that cyber operations that are qualitatively “attacks,” as the term is used in
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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IHL, qualify as hostilities in the same way as kinetic attacks. Attacks, as explained
further below, are operations causing damage or injury. There is no normative or
practical logic for distinguishing between a cyber operation that damages objects
or injures people and a kinetic operation with precisely the same effects.
However, whether cyber operations not qualifying as attacks under IHL
may initiate an armed conflict remains unsettled. For instance, would cyber
operations that result in a
The harsh reality of . . . military cyber activity major loss of confidence in
is that the heavy reliance on civilian products the stock market—a conseand infrastructure dramatically expands the
quence far more serious than
universe of targetable objects.
minor property damage or
injury—qualify? As noted by
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “it would appear that the
answer to these questions will probably be determined in a definite manner only
through future State practice.”10
Second, is there any minimum severity below which an attack, whether kinetic
or cyber, cannot be considered as having started an international armed conflict?
The quantitative threshold is unclear in law. It is sometimes argued that, for instance, minor exchanges of fire between the forces of two states do not rise to the
level of armed conflict. However, a better view is that which has been asserted
by the ICRC for many years: “It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts,
how much slaughter takes place, or how numerous are the participating forces.”11
This approach is, as lawyers say, more consistent with the “object and purpose”
of IHL, since a state will want its civilians and civilian objects protected, and at
the same time it will wish to be able to use lethal or destructive force against the
other side if hostilities break out.
Accordingly, an international armed conflict could begin solely on the basis of
cyber exchanges if two or more states were involved and the nature of the operations qualified them as attacks. To cite a well-known example, consider the 2010
Stuxnet operation against Iran. Assuming, solely for the sake of illustration, that
it was states that conducted the operation, the damage arguably meant that the
states involved were in an international armed conflict, at least for the period
during which the damaging acts were under way.12
Cyber exchanges alone are far less likely to meet the two criteria for noninternational armed conflict.13 First, the state must be facing an “organized armed
group.” Although the legal preconditions for qualification as such are rather complicated, in the cyber context the pressing question is whether they are met by a
group organized entirely online. Organized armed groups have to be in some way
“commanded,” and some degree of structure must exist that allows their members to operate as a unit.14 It is also often suggested that “organization” requires a
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/3
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means to enforce IHL within the group.15 It is difficult to see how a virtual group
whose members may not even know each other’s names or physical locations
could meet this condition.
Additionally, the group in question must be armed. The logic underlying
the discussion of international armed conflict would appear useful by analogy.
“Armed” can be interpreted as a requirement for “hostilities,” which are acts that
qualify as “attacks.” In this context, therefore, an organized armed group is one
that conducts kinetic or cyber attacks. Thus, a group that merely conducted nondestructive denial-of-service operations, for example, would not qualify. This is
one reason why the operations against Estonia did not rise to the level of a noninternational armed conflict. Those involved were acting in concert, but they were
not organized into one or more particular armed groups.
Second, and unlike international armed conflict, the violence associated with
a noninternational armed conflict must be protracted and must reach a high level
of severity. It does not include “situations of internal disturbances and tensions,
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar
nature.”16 Even cyber operations causing death or destruction will sometimes not
suffice. Neither would a single dramatic cyber operation, such as a cyber terrorist
attack, qualify, even if causing harm far above the level just characterized, because
that harm would not be protracted. In the simplest terms, the cyber conflict must
start looking like a war. To turn again to the Estonian case, the hacktivist operations did not rise to this level because, despite widespread disruption of societal
functions, there was no physical damage or injury.
Nonstate-actor cyber operations meeting these demanding criteria are currently unlikely. A more probable scenario is one in which cyber operations accompany kinetic ones and are governed by IHL on that basis. Therefore, when
nonstate-actor cyber operations occur in isolation from kinetic attacks, they will
typically be governed by the domestic law of states exercising jurisdiction over
the persons and particular subject matter involved, as well as by human rights
law, but not by the IHL norms described below.
THE APPLICABLE LAW (PART II)
Once it is determined that an armed conflict to which IHL applies is under way,
the next step is to determine whether the law of targeting applies to the cyber
operation in question.17 Doing so is more difficult than might appear at first
glance. Indeed, the Tallinn Manual experts struggled with the subject for three
years without reaching full consensus.
Any discussion of targeting begins with the principle of “distinction,” which is
codified in Article 48 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions: “The Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives and accordingly direct their operations only against military objectives.”18 The United States, though not a party to that instrument, recognizes
Article 48 as reflective of customary international law, which binds all states.19
Indeed, the principle is arguably the most important in IHL, one that the International Court of Justice has labeled as one of the two “cardinal” principles of IHL.20
In international law circles, a major debate with particular resonance in the cyber
context is ongoing regarding whether the principle of distinction rules out all
operations against objects and persons that do not qualify as military objectives,
especially civilians and civilian objects. Textually, the article certainly appears to
say as much, but such a conclusion would be both counterintuitive and ahistorical. After all, military operations, such as psychological operations, have been
directed against civilian populations for centuries.
A closer look into Additional Protocol I reveals a series of prohibitions and
restrictions on “attack” that operationalize the principle: attacks against civilians
and civilian objects are prohibited, indiscriminate attacks are forbidden, parties
to a conflict must take precautions to minimize civilian harm when planning
and conducting attacks, a defender must take precautions to protect the civilian
population against the effects of attacks, and so forth.21 Helpfully, “attacks” are
defined in the protocol as “acts of violence against the enemy, whether in offence or defence.”22 The characterization of an attack as a violent act is repeated
throughout the treaty and in ICRC and other commentaries thereon.23
It would seem, however, that the protocol is inaptly worded. Violent acts are
of less concern in IHL than are violent consequences. This has been obvious for
decades, the paradigmatic examples being the prohibitions on chemical, biological, and radiological attacks, which are not violent in the sense of releasing kinetic
force but have violent consequences, notably death. By the same logic, a cyber
operation causing injury to persons or damage to objects is an attack subject to
all the relevant IHL rules on attacks.24
But controversy surrounds the issue of whether the notion of attacks should be
interpreted more broadly. A cyber operation targeting civilian cyber infrastructure (“communications, storage, and computing resources upon which information systems operate”) without physical effects could be far more detrimental
than one causing limited damage.25 Consider an attack during an armed conflict
on the enemy’s banking, taxation, government pension, or airline reservations
systems. Critics of a restrictive interpretation argue that it seems incongruent to
prohibit only operations having physical effects.
Two methods have surfaced that take account of this reality without the necessity of either successfully negotiating new treaty terms (an unlikely eventuality)
or interpreting the current law in a fashion that renders it unrecognizable. First,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/3
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there are those who would interpret data as an object, such that an operation that
manipulated, altered, or deleted civilian data would be prohibited.26 The conceptual problem is that the ICRC commentary to Additional Protocol I describes
an object as something “tangible,” and data certainly is not that.27 Goal-oriented
legal academics have proposed creative interpretation as a means of hurdling this
particular obstacle but fail to offer a viable practical alternative. If data is treated
as an object, any operation that manipulates civilian data would qualify as “damage” to (alteration of data) or “destruction” of (deletion of data) a “civilian object”
and would thus be unlawful. As an example, deletion of a civilian’s forum or blog
post would be a violation of IHL, as would nondestructive psychological cyber
operations directed at the civilian population. Moreover, such an interpretation
would dramatically affect application of the rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precautions in attack. Both, as discussed below, extend further
protection to civilian objects, the former by prohibiting attacks likely to cause
“excessive” collateral damage to civilian objects, the latter by requiring an attacker to take feasible measures to limit damage to civilian objects.28 International
humanitarian law is a careful balancing of humanitarian concerns with military
necessity; simply styling data as an object would throw this balance out of kilter,
by barring operations that today are considered lawful in both their cyber and
traditional guises.
The second approach, and the one adopted by a majority of the experts involved in the Tallinn Manual project, is to include “loss of functionality” in the
concept of damage.29 On this view, a cyber operation that affects the functionality of cyber infrastructure (from a laptop computer to a SCADA system*) in a
manner that necessitates repair qualifies as an attack even if no physical damage
results. This approach makes sense, for it is fair to describe an item as damaged
when it does not work; it is broken, even though it may not be physically damaged. Among the experts taking this position during the Tallinn Manual project
there were various shades of opinion. Some were of the view that necessity to
reload an operating system satisfied the damage criterion. Others went so far as
to say that cyber operations affecting data stored on the computer’s drives would
suffice, although this was a minority view.
The implications of the majority positions set out above are significant. Unless a cyber operation has consequences that at least affect the functionality of an
object, it is not damaged in the IHL sense and the operation does not qualify as an
attack. Therefore, the operation is not subject to the prohibition on conducting
* Supervisory control and data acquisition—referring to “computer systems and instrumentation that
provide for monitoring and controlling industrial, infrastructure, and facility-based processes, such
as the operation of power plants, water treatment facilities, electrical distribution systems, oil and
gas pipelines, airports, and factories” (Tallinn Manual, p. 262).
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attacks against civilian objects. As a result, it is generally legal during an armed
conflict to conduct cyber operations directed against civilian objects, so long as
these objects are not physically damaged or do not lose functionality (or somehow result in injury to civilians). To illustrate, it would be lawful to conduct
denial-of-service attacks that blocked civilian e-services such as tax collection
or the payment of pension benefits but did not harm or affect the functionality
of the associated cyber infrastructure, at least until the economic consequences
became so severe that they began to have physical effects, such as starvation or
illness. Similarly, by the majority approach it would be lawful to alter or destroy
data so long as no consequences amounting to injury, physical damage, or loss of
functionality are manifest; examples could include government archives, birth or
citizenship records, business records, and market returns. Although such operations might raise serious moral, political, and social issues, they appear lawful
today.
THE TARGET
Assuming that a cyber operation occurs during an armed conflict and qualifies
as an attack, the next hurdle is determining whether the target is a lawful one.
Cyber operations most frequently implicate the prohibition on attacking civilian
objects. In IHL, civilian objects are defined negatively as “all objects which are
not military objectives.”30 Military objectives are “objects which by their nature,
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”31
The equipment and facilities of the armed forces are military objectives by
nature; a command-and-control facility and cyber infrastructure developed for
specific military tasks both qualify, for example, on this basis. A particular location can also be a military objective, as when cyber means are used to open a
dam’s gates to flood an area and deny its use to the enemy. Aside from military
equipment, the most likely military objective in the cyber context is an object
that qualifies by the “use” criterion—that is, one that was formerly or is still being
used for civilian purposes but is now being employed, at least in part, for military
ends. It should be cautioned that a rule of reason holds when applying this criterion to cyber activities. For instance, the mere fact that the military sends e-mail
over the Internet does not render the entire Internet a lawful target. Finally, a
civilian object can become a military objective through “purpose,” which refers to
the intended future use of an object. For example, if there is reliable intelligence
that a civilian server farm will soon begin to store military data, the farm is a
military objective that may be attacked even before data storage begins.
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These definitions do not present any particular problems in the cyber setting.
However, it must be acknowledged that the pervasive use of civilian cyber infrastructure for military purposes has transformed much of it into the character of
valid military objectives. When an object is used for both civilian and military
purposes, it is labeled “dual
use.” In targeting terms, the
There is now widespread agreement that
international humanitarian law applies in its term applies whether someentirety to cyber operations conducted during thing is exclusively used for
military purposes, is shared
an armed conflict.
by civilian and military users,
or is only used to a limited degree by the military—it qualifies as a targetable military objective. The civilian aspects of the target are relevant to the requirements
for proportionality and precautions in attack as described below, but civilian use
does not diminish its qualification as a military objective.
To take a simple example, many air-traffic-control and airspace-management
systems serve both civilian and military aircraft. When this is the case, they are
military objectives irrespective of the extent of civilian reliance on them. The
communications lines to which the systems are connected are also dual-use and
so too qualify as military objectives, as do any routers involved and any servers
on which their data is stored. The harsh reality of twenty-first-century military
cyber activity is that the heavy reliance on civilian products and infrastructure
dramatically expands the universe of targetable objects, including systems on
which important civilian functions rely.
The introduction of cyber capabilities into contemporary combat has also
exacerbated a long-standing debate over the very notion of military objectives.
All states and legal commentators agree that the term encompasses “war fighting” and “war supporting” objects. The former are those used to conduct military
operations, whereas the latter include objects on which military operations rely
in some relatively direct sense, such as factories that make munitions, weapons,
or equipment (including computer equipment) used by the military, even when
they also produce civilian products. They may not necessarily be attacked, because of the rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precautions, but
they unquestionably qualify as military objectives. What is especially significant
with regard to the war-supporting category in the cyber context is the extent to
which the dependence of the armed forces on civilian products and infrastructure makes not only the objects in question legally targetable but also the facilities
that produce them.
However, a third category, “war sustaining” objects, has generated widespread controversy. The U.S. Navy’s Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval
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Operations, the most current U.S. manual addressing international humanitarian
law, labels enemy war-sustaining objects as military objectives susceptible to
lawful attack.32 An annotated version of the previous edition of the handbook
offers the example of cotton during the American Civil War.33 But for the export
of cotton, the Confederacy would have been unable to finance its war effort. Cotton exports, then, sustained the war; therefore, according to this approach, that
industry was lawfully targetable. The contemporary analogue would be those aspects of an economy or governmental financial system on which the enemy relies
to fund participation in the conflict. Obvious examples are the oil industries of
countries that depend heavily on oil exports for funds; although the United States
has never developed the concept with any granularity, other examples might also
include the tax systems, financial systems, transport networks, and the like.
The significance of this approach in its application to the cyber environment
cannot be overstated. Many war-sustaining targets cannot be struck kinetically
in a fashion that would generate the same effects as cyber attacks. Consider the
banking system. While kinetic attacks against banks would be highly disruptive,
they would be unlikely, given the limitations of kinetic weaponry and the number of potential targets falling into this category, to create strategic effects on the
order of undermining the sustainability of the war effort. However, cyber attacks
that would, for instance, render dysfunctional the cyber infrastructure on which
the banking system relies could bring the entire system down. The war-sustaining
debate once loomed large; the ability of cyber operations to make war-sustaining
attacks possible and effective at the operational and strategic levels will probably
reinvigorate it. This is especially so in light of the fact that very few states have
openly embraced the U.S. approach, thereby rendering the world’s most cyberempowered military an outlier on the matter. Ironically, the United States is itself
highly vulnerable to attacks on its own “war sustaining” infrastructure, thereby
raising the question whether its interpretation is ill-advised when applied to the
cyber context.
In addition to objects, “persons” may qualify as lawful targets. It is, of course,
possible to attack people by cyber means—for instance, by starting fires in facilities in which they are located, interfering with air-traffic control relied on by the
aircraft transporting them, causing train collisions, and so forth. Additionally,
individuals involved in cyber operations may be targeted kinetically once they
have been identified and located. The issues are which people are targetable, as a
matter of law, and when they may be targeted.
Obviously, members of the armed forces who conduct cyber operations are
always targetable (unless hors de combat); they are combatants.34 The rules regarding when civilians may be targeted are far more complex. To address this,
the International Committee of the Red Cross sponsored a five-year (between
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/3
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2003 and 2008) research study involving a group of forty international experts.35
The experts agreed that members of an organized armed group, as defined above,
are targetable while they are members of the group.36 They disagreed, however,
over precisely which members of the group were targetable. The ICRC was of the
position that only those with a “continuous combat function” could be attacked.
Such functions encompass roles in the group that involve activities likely to affect
the enemy adversely.37 Some individual participants in the project, including the
author, countered that all members of a group formed to conduct hostilities (or
the members of the armed wing of a group that includes other functions, such
as Hamas) could be attacked, a position that appears to be favored by the United
States, Israel, and other countries with significant combat experience.38
Applied to cyber, the approaches taken to direct participation lead in different
directions. Take an organized armed group that conducts kinetic hostilities but
also has “cyber operators.” All those who conduct cyber operations against the
enemy or who defend against the enemy’s operations have continuous combat
functions and therefore would be targetable by either approach. Other members
may have such cyber-related duties as maintaining propaganda websites or recruiting members. By the ICRC approach, they do not have continuous combat
functions and therefore would not be targetable unless they assumed such functions within the group. By the alternative approach, they could be attacked at any
time, on the basis of their membership in the group.
Individuals unaffiliated with organized armed groups or, in the ICRC approach, who do not have continuous combat functions in such groups are targetable only “for such time” as they “take a direct part in hostilities.”39 An act
amounts to direct participation when it meets three criteria.40 First, it must either
adversely affect the military operations or military capability of one of the parties
to the conflict or injure or damage persons or objects protected by IHL, such as
civilians and civilian objects.41 It is important to understand that this criterion
does not require that the activity qualify as an attack. As an example, gathering
and disseminating tactical- and operational-level intelligence by cyber means
suffices, as would probing enemy systems to identify vulnerabilities.
Second, the qualifying activity must directly cause the harm or be an integral
component of the operation that does so.42 There has been some controversy over
this requirement with respect to the production of improvised explosive devices
and services as voluntary human shields. Although both activities are sometimes
characterized as indirect, the better position is that causal nexus between such
activities and harm to the enemy is sufficiently direct.43 The cyber analogue
would be developing software specific to an attack on the enemy system or allowing cyber operations to be launched from one’s home or business by others.
One thing on which all parties agree is that factory workers do not qualify as
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

Book 1.indb 21

11

2/4/15 10:24 AM

22

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 2, Art. 3

direct participants in hostilities. This being so, individuals involved in the general
production of cyber infrastructure and equipment or in its general (as distinct
from operational) maintenance are not targetable direct participants, although
the facilities in which they operate qualify as military targets by virtue of their use.
The third requirement is that there be a nexus between the activity and the
conflict.44 In other words, the activity must be related to the ongoing conflict, as
distinct from being an act of criminality or mere maliciousness. Although the
facts of particular cases are sometimes difficult to discern, experts are in accord
on this criterion.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the direct-participation rules in
the cyber context. The Georgia-Russia armed conflict, as well as subsequent ones,
demonstrates that the civilian
To borrow a sports analogy, a team that takes population is highly likely to
become involved in the cyber
the field without knowing the rules is usually
aspects of the conflict. For
going to lose, even if it is the better team.
instance, in the Georgia case a
website (StopGeorgia.ru) containing cyber targets and downloadable “malware”
(malicious software) necessary to conduct cyber operations appeared online
soon after the launch of kinetic operations.45 The site proved effective in enabling
cyber operations by civilians against Georgian military and civilian cyber targets.
As this example illustrates, it is far easier to “cyber arm” a civilian population
than to arm it with traditional weaponry. Additionally, many individuals have
the know-how to conduct harmful cyber operations; all they require to begin
participating in the hostilities is connectivity.
To compound matters, the scope of activities constituting direct participation
in hostilities is broad. Conducting a simple denial-of-service operation, building
a botnet* for use against the enemy, or texting to report visual sightings of enemy
forces would all qualify as direct participation that justifies lethally attacking the
civilian involved. As should be apparent, the direct-participation rule could make
the pool of targetable individuals extremely large in future conflicts, far more
than is the case in classic conflict.
That said, one possible obstacle to far-reaching application of the rule is that
a direct participant is targetable only “for such time” as he or she is so participating.46 The ICRC has suggested that this period includes measures preparatory
to specific acts of direct participation, as well as deployment to and return from
the activity concerned.47 This is a rather impractical standard in the cyber context. Except for close-access operations (those involving in-person manipulation of cyber infrastructure), there is usually no deployment to and from cyber
* “A network of compromised computers, the ‘bots,’ remotely controlled by the intruder, ‘the
botherder,’ used to conduct coordinated [malicious] cyber operations” (Tallinn Manual, p. 257).
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operations; they are conducted remotely. Thus, by the ICRC approach, the direct
participant would have to be caught in the act, a standard that dramatically narrows the window of targetability. Further rendering this position impracticable
is the fact that cyber operations can be very brief, sometimes so brief that an
attacker cannot be identified to a level of reasonable confidence before the operation is over. Therefore, the better approach is to characterize an individual who
engages in multiple cyber operations that are part of an ongoing cyber campaign
as a direct participant targetable throughout the period of activity. Once individuals definitively withdraw from participation, they regain their protection
from attack, but not before.48
THE WEAPON
While certain uses of cyber weapons (destructive or injurious malware), such as
“attacking” civilians, violate IHL, cyber weapons may also be unlawful per se—
that is, irrespective of actual use. The prohibition most relevant in this regard is
that on indiscriminate means (weapons).49 Weapons are prohibited when they either cannot be directed at a specific military objective or generate uncontrollable
effects. In both cases, the weapons are indiscriminate in the sense that they are
incapable of distinguishing between combatants and civilians or between civilian
objects and military objectives. The paradigmatic example of the former is the
V-2 rocket used during World War II, which had a guidance system so rudimentary that the rocket could not be reliably aimed at individual military objectives.
Biological contagions illustrate the latter, because an attacker employing them
cannot control their spread from human to human.
Cyber weapons may at times run afoul of these prohibitions. For example,
consider malware intended for use against military cyber infrastructure linked to
civilian networks. If the malware is designed to spread randomly throughout the
system into which it is introduced, it is indiscriminate by nature and prohibited
per se. Similarly, malware developed for placement on a website that is open to
civilians and combatants alike would qualify as indiscriminate irrespective of
any desire on the part of its user to affect only military systems. Perhaps the bestknown indiscriminate cyber weapon is a malicious but seemingly innocuous email attachment sent to a combatant’s private e-mail account. Since the attacker
has no control over to whom it might be forwarded, the e-mail, depending on
its apparent nature (e.g., a humorous e-mail likely to be forwarded), would be
indiscriminate.
It must be cautioned that the restrictions on indiscriminate weapons apply
only when the cyber weapon in question is designed to conduct attacks. They do
not bear on malware that does not cause injury, damage, or loss of system functionality. For instance, an e-mail attachment that when opened simply enables
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future access by the sender would not be unlawful under IHL, even though the
sender might not be able to control its further spread into civilian systems.
Because of this, as well as the fact that advanced cyber weapons likely to be
used by states in armed conflict are by their nature designed to exploit particular
vulnerabilities in specific systems, few cyber weapons violate the prohibition on
indiscriminate weapons. For example, bespoke cyber weapons can be employed
against closed military systems in which the risk of bleed-over into civilian
networks is low. Of course, there is always some risk of unintentional or unanticipated migration into civilian systems, as illustrated by the Stuxnet malware,
which, contrary to the intent of its designers, escaped the nuclear enrichment
plant that had been targeted. Yet the risk of malfunction or unanticipated effects
is a pervasive feature of weaponry writ large; only when the weapon is incapable
of being aimed or controlled is it prohibited as indiscriminate.
PRECAUTIONS TO AVOID CIVILIAN HARM
Even when employing a lawful cyber weapon against a lawful target, an attacker
must take “constant care” to “spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian
objects.”50 To this end the law specifies a number of precautionary measures. The
attacker must do everything feasible to verify that the target is not protected by
IHL;51 must select the weapon, tactic, and target that will minimize civilian harm
without forfeiting military advantage;52 must cancel or suspend an attack when
reason to believe that the attack may be unlawful comes to light;53 and must warn
the civilian population of any attack that may affect it, unless doing so would not
be feasible in the circumstances.54
Cyber capabilities raise a number of issues in this regard. They can, for example, be used to gather target information. If doing so would improve knowledge
of the target’s legal status (and if it is militarily feasible in the circumstances, given
such factors as attack timing and competing demands on the cyber asset), the
attacker must undertake the effort. Cyber operations may also provide a means
of issuing warnings to the civilian population of both cyber and kinetic attack.
For instance, general warnings of attack could be transmitted through civilian
systems networked to military cyber infrastructure urging measures to be taken
to safeguard them from the effects of attack on the military objectives.
However, the most significant impact of the precautions-in-attack rules lies in
the requirement to consider alternative weapons, tactics, and targets to minimize
civilian incidental harm. To illustrate, it may be possible to neutralize an integrated air-defense system by cyber means instead of by conducting kinetic attacks
against its assorted components. Since cyber operations would in most cases be
less likely to cause collateral damage, they would be required by law in lieu of
kinetic alternatives, if their employment is feasible and militarily sensible. Cyber
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operations may also open the possibility of striking different targets to achieve a
desired effect. As an example, to disrupt enemy operations it may be possible to
use cyber assets against communications infrastructure serving a command-andcontrol facility located near civilians, rather than attacking the facility itself, and
achieve precisely the desired effect. Indeed, it could prove useful to preserve the
facility to exploit it subsequently by using cyber means to transmit false instructions and other information to the enemy forces.
It must be emphasized that the precautions-in-attack rule regarding selection
of weapons, tactics, and targets is obligatory. If cyber means are reasonably available, their use makes military sense in the circumstances, and their employment
would not diminish the likelihood of operational success, the attacking force
must use them. Failure to do so will violate the law. It is accordingly prudent for
those who plan, approve, and execute military operations to have ready access to
cyber expertise that can apprise them of cyber options. Ignorance is not an excuse
for failure to comply with the rule in situations where the individual concerned
should have known that a cyber operation was feasible in the circumstances and
would likely have resulted in less collateral damage.
COLLATERAL DAMAGE
Once the attacker has surveyed the range of possible operations to achieve the
desired effects and selected that viable alternative that best minimizes collateral
damage, the operation is assessed against the rule of proportionality. This rule
provides that “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” is prohibited.55
Two mistakes have proved common in application of the rule of proportionality. First, the rule is often mischaracterized as a balancing test in which military
advantage and collateral damage are somehow accorded values that presumably
can be compared. Not only is it difficult to imagine how this could be done in
practice, but portraying proportionality as a balancing test runs counter to the
plain text of the rule, which precludes an attack only when the collateral damage
is “excessive.” “Excessive” refers to a “significant imbalance,” one in which it is reasonably clear that causing the expected degree of collateral damage is not justified
by the military advantage the attacker hopes to attain.56 Since cyber operations
can generate effects that are not typically present in warfare and are therefore
somewhat unfamiliar, fidelity to the “excessive” standard is essential, as it affords
the attacker the correct degree of discretion.
Second, the rule is unfortunately often applied post factum. However, as is
clear from its text, the proportionality assessment is made ex ante (i.e., at the
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outset). Expected collateral damage is assessed against the anticipated military
advantage. The actual collateral damage caused and the military advantage that
actually results are relevant to evaluating the reasonableness of the attacker’s preattack proportionality assessment but are not dispositive of whether the attacker
has satisfied the rule of proportionality. This is again an important point in the
cyber context, because of the widespread linkage of civilian and military systems
and the difficulty an attacker may face in evaluating potential effects at the time
the cyber mission is planned,
Cyber activities have become an indelible
approved, or executed.
facet of contemporary warfare, not just for
With respect to the subcyber-empowered militaries such as that of the stantive aspects of proporUnited States, but also for low-tech forces.
tionality, cyber operations can
serve to minimize collateral
damage and therefore make compliance with the rule more likely. The networked
nature of cyber infrastructure, however, heightens the risk of indirect effects on
civilian systems. This is particularly true in light of the wide-ranging reliance of
some militaries on dual-use cyber systems. To the extent to which indirect effects
are foreseeable, they must be considered when making proportionality calculations. That said, the proportionality rule, like the prohibition on weapons generating uncontrollable effects, requires the consideration only of “loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians,” and “damage to civilian objects.” Other, indirect effects
of a cyber operation on civilians, civilian objects, and other persons and objects
protected by IHL are not factored into the equation.
Cyber operations appeared on the battlefield in a dangerous interpretive void.
As so often happens, technology has outpaced the law, or at least in this case
full understanding of how extant law governs emerging cyber capabilities. Such
a state of affairs is always strategically perilous. On the one hand, options that
are in fact lawful are sometimes needlessly taken off the table out of misguided
concern about their legality. On the other, unlawful options are at times seriously
considered, thereby risking public and international condemnation should they
be selected.
The normative fog of cyber war is beginning to clear, albeit slowly. This article has surveyed those aspects of international humanitarian law relevant to
targeting, the activity during an armed conflict that poses the greatest risk to the
defender and the civilian population. But targeting equally poses the greatest
risk to the attacker, not only from an operational perspective, but also in terms
of mission accomplishment. Characterization of a cyber operation as unlawful
can quickly wipe away any gains that the operation has attained. It is accordingly
essential that those occupying roles having responsibility for overseeing and
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executing cyber operations develop a degree of understanding of their normative
boundaries.
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